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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, THIRD DEPARTMENT
Kings Mall, LLC v. Wenkt
(decided July 5, 2007)
Kings Mall, LLC, ("Kings Mall") the owner of a shopping
mall, brought an action to permanently enjoin the defendants, a group
of protestors against the war in Iraq, from entering its property.2 At
the outset of the litigation, Kings Mall filed a motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction, and upon satisfaction of the requisite elements,3 the
state supreme court granted its motion.4 The defendants appealed to
the Appellate Division, Third Department, which addressed whether
the defendants' free speech protections afforded under the United
States Constitution 5 or the New York Constitution 6 were violated
when they were enjoined from protesting against the federal govern-
ment within the "privately" owned mall.7 The appellate division af-
firmed, holding that the defendant's constitutional rights were not vi-
' 839 N.Y.S.2d 313 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2007).
2 Wenk, 839 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
3 Id. "In order to have been entitled to a preliminary injunction, plaintiff had to establish
(1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable injury and (3) a balancing of the eq-
uities in its favor." Id. (citing In re Kalichman, 820 N.Y.S.2d 648 (App. Div. 3d Dep't
2006)).
4 Wenk, 839 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. I, states, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law ... abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the press ......
6 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8, states, in pertinent part: "Every citizen may freely speak, write
and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and
no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press."
7 Wenk, 839 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
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olated because the mall's actions did not amount to state action.8
The mall accommodates thirty-two stores, one of which is
leased by the United States government as a military recruiting cen-
ter, and a common area all under the roof of a large, single space.9
"Displayed at every entrance to the mall are printed notices advising
that the mall 'is reserved only for the use of the owners and em-
ployees of business tenants and their patrons' and entering ... 'for
any other purpose is prohibited.' ",0
In May 2005, the defendants commenced a series of "aggres-
sive and disorderly" protests against the war in Iraq within the mall's
premises, clearly failing to comply with the reservations posted at the
various mall entrances." On a number of occasions, mall tenants
summoned the police, which resulted in the arrests of some of the de-
fendants for harassment, trespass, and disorderly conduct. 12 In re-
sponse, the mall owner filed an action with the state supreme court
and subsequently moved for temporary relief. Under the lease
agreements with its tenants, Kings Mall was required to act to prevent
and dispose of any actions detrimental to its tenants' business opera-
tions. 13 In support of its motion, Kings Mall submitted sworn affida-
vits from a number of its tenants, which attested to a decline in the
amount of customers and sales at its stores during the organized pro-
8 Id.
9 Id. at 315.
1o Id.
" Id. at 315.
12 Wenk, 839 N.Y.S.2d at 315 n. 1 ("The harassment charges were dismissed in the interest
of justice, while the other charges were adjourned in contemplation of dismissal.").
3 Id. at316.
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tests.14
The defendants argued that the tenants' affidavits were not
supported by sufficient facts and further that any damages incurred as
a result of the protests could be adequately compensated. 15 The trial
court disagreed, and granted the preliminary injunction, but stipulated
the defendants would be permitted to protest outside the premises of
the mall at specified times.16 The defendants appealed to the Appel-
late Division, Third Department, which affirmed the lower court's
decision, concluding that: (1) the plaintiff was likely to succeed on
the merits of the case; 17 (2) that without the issuance of a preliminary
injunction the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm;' 8 (3) and that
the potential loss to the plaintiff, in terms of money and visitors, far
outweighed an order requiring defendants to protest outside the con-
fines of the mall. 9
On appeal, the reassessment of the preliminary injunction
elements raised the issue of whether the federal or state constitution
protected the defendants' actions.2z If protected, the plaintiff would
be unable to establish likelihood of success on the merits and the pre-
liminary injunction would be overturned. The appellate division
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 315 ("[The] court granted a preliminary injunction, allowing defendants to protest
on the outside sidewalks of the mall during a two-hour time period on Saturday after-
noons.").
17 Wenk, 839N.Y.S.2d. at 316.
18 Id. The court found that monetary compensation would be an inadequate remedy for
the plaintiff" 'because of the difficulty in proving how many individuals would have been
deterred from patronizing those businesses as a direct result of defendants' conduct.' " Id.
(quoting People v. Anderson, 529 N.Y.S.2d 917, 924 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1988) (alteration
in original)).
19 Wenk, 839 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
20 Id. at 315.
2008]
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found that "the state and federal constitutional guarantees of free
speech protect individuals against governmental action," and not
against individual action.2' The appellate division found no evidence
of any federal or state governmental action in violation of the defen-
dants' constitutional rights.22 Accordingly, the court affirmed the
granting of the preliminary injunction, reasoning that because the
mall owner was a private party, the defendants did not have an ac-
tionable freedom of speech claim.23
The appellate division also addressed whether the defendants
were afforded protection under the Federal Constitution.24 Accor-
dingly, the court referred to the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Hudgens v. NLRB.25 In Hudgens, four warehouse employees
of the Butler Shoe Company entered a privately-owned shopping
mall and began picketing against one of the mall's retail stores in re-
sponse to the tenant store's refusal to comply with the contract de-
mands of the employees' union.26
Initially, the mall general manager warned the protestors that
if they did not refrain from picketing and leave, they would be ar-
rested.27 The general manager's threat of arrest was successful; the
employees departed. However, the departure was short-lived and the
picketers returned. Once more, the general manager threatened the
21 Id. at 315 (citing SHAD Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 488 N.E.2d 1211 (N.Y. 1985)).
22 Wenk, 839 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
26 Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 509.
27 Id.
250 [Vol. 24
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striking employees with arrest and again they vacated the premises. 28
However, after this second threat the employees' union filed a claim
with the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"), "alleging inter-
ference with rights protected by section seven of the [National Labor
Relations] Act.",29
The NLRB entered a cease and desist order against the owner
of the shopping mall, finding that the warehouse employees were af-
forded the right to protest on the mall premises under the First
Amendment. 30 Upon petition for review, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Board's ruling. 31 The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari.32
The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's decision and
remanded with directions that the First Amendment right of freedom
of speech should receive no consideration in the case's ultimate deci-
sion.33 The Court held the striking warehouse employees were not
afforded a First Amendment right to protest against the company
within the confines of the shopping mall.34 In its analysis, the Court
28 Id.
29 Id. at 509-10. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 157 (West 2000).
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or as-
sist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and
shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities ex-
cept to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requir-
ing membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment ..
Id.
30 Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 510.
31 Id. at 512.
32 420 U.S. at 971 (1975).
33 Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 523.
14 Id. at521.
2008]
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followed the reasoning set forth in Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner.35
Lloyd involved a group of people who entered a shopping
mall and "distributed ... handbill invitations to a meeting of the 'Re-
sistance Community' to protest the draft and the Vietnam war."36 Al-
though the handbill solicitation was peaceful and received few com-
plaints, the mall abided by a long-standing policy of prohibiting any
form of handbilling inside its facility. 37 Accordingly, security guards
advised the solicitors that they would be arrested for trespassing un-
less they refrained from distributing their handbills inside the mall.38
The solicitors complied with the guards' request and, at the guards'
suggestion, resumed distributing handbills on the public walkways
outside the mall.39 However, the solicitors initiated a lawsuit pre-
mised on a First Amendment violation and sought an injunction to
prevent the property owner from barring them from handbilling with-
in the mall.4 0 The district court held, and the circuit court of appeals
affirmed, that the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights were violated
when they were prohibited from distributing their handbills within
the mall.4 '
The Supreme Court granted the mall owner's petition for cer-
tiorari42 to determine whether prohibiting solicitors from distributing
handbills on privately-owned mall property was contrary to the free
" 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
36 Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 556.
3 Id. at 555.
3 Id. at 556.
39 Id.
40 Id.
4 ' Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 556-57.
42 404 U.S. 1037 (1972).
[Vol. 24
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speech provisions afforded under the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution.43 The Court overturned the lower courts' deci-
sions, finding that even though the mall was open to the general pub-
lic and contained sidewalks, streets, and parking areas, it did not lose
its private nature, and thus was permitted to prohibit solicitors from
distributing handbills on its property.'
The Supreme Court found that the mall's invitation to the
public was extended for the purpose of inducing business transactions
with those who maintain retail space therein.a In particular, the mall
owner informed the public via small signs at various locations within
the mall that the "Areas . . . Used By The Public Are Not Public
Ways But Are For The Use Of Lloyd Center Tenants And The Public
Transacting Business With Them. Permission To Use Said Areas
May Be Revoked At Any Time. 46 The Court held the mall retained
its private nature despite inviting the public to shop within its facili-
ty 47 The Court reasoned that a private individual store does not "as-
sume[] significant public attributes merely because the public is in-
vited to shop there., 48 The Court took this notion further and held, by
increasing property size and adding a number of adjoining stores to
an individual store, thereby creating a shopping mall, there was no ef-
fect on the private nature of the property as a whole despite the prop-
erty's continued openness to the public and increased commercial ca-
4' Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 567.
44 Id. at 568-69.
45 Id. at 565 (citing Amalgamated Food Emp. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 338 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)).
46 Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 554-55.
47 Id. at 569.
48 Id.
2008] 253
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pacity.49
Moreover, the Court disagreed that the presence of sidewalks,
streets, and parking areas classified the property as a municipality.5 °
If this were so, the Court reasoned, then the public at large, whether
invited or not, would be entitled to enter a mall and enjoy the same
free speech protections afforded when on a city street or town side-
walk. 51 The Court found, "The Constitution by no means requires
such an attenuated doctrine of dedication of private property to public
use." 52 Nothing in the record suggested to the Court that the mall
owner intended any of its property to be dedicated to public use.53
Rather, the mall was intended to be a commerce center where the
public was invited to engage in business with the multitude of stores
leasing space within its complex.54
Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's
decision and held that the solicitors were not entitled to First
Amendment protections. The Court found the Federal Constitution
"safeguard[s] the rights of free speech.., by limitations on state ac-
tion, not on action by the owner of private property used nondiscri-
minatorily for private purposes only. '55 Therefore, it follows that if a
privately-owned shopping mall has not dedicated its property to pub-
lic use, it may restrict speech rights on its premises because such ac-
tions would be carried out by a private owner, and not the govern-
49 Id.
'o Id. at 569.
"' Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 569.
52 Id.
" Id. at 570.
14 Id. at 564.
" Id. at 567.
254 [Vol. 24
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ment.56
In contrast, in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,57 a case
decided eight years later, the Supreme Court affirmed a judgment
permitting a group of individuals to distribute pamphlets and peti-
tions within a privately-owned shopping mall open to the public.58
However, this right was not afforded under the Federal Constitution,
but rather under the California State Constitution.59 At the state level,
the California Supreme Court held a group of students the had right
to exercise their free speech rights within the premises of the private-
ly-owned property without threat of retaliation by mall ownership.
60
In PruneYard, a group of high school students entered the
privately-owned PruneYard shopping center to encourage others to
join in their petition in opposition to a "United Nations resolution
against 'Zionism,' " albeit in a peaceful manner.61 Similar to the cas-
es already discussed, the solicitors were approached by mall security
and ordered to relocate their activities to the public sidewalks along-
side the perimeter of the mall's property.62 Though the students
complied, they commenced a lawsuit arguing that their federal and
state constitutional rights were violated.63 The trial court and the
court of appeals both disagreed, but the California Supreme Court re-
56 Wenk, 839 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
" 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
58 PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 88.
59 Id. at 78. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of
speech or press."); CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 3 ("The people have the right to ... petition gov-
ernment for redress of grievances, and assemble freely .....
60 PruneYard, 477 U.S. at 78.
61 Id. at 77 (internal citations omitted).
62 Id.
63 id.
20081
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versed the lower courts' decisions and held the students' state consti-
tutional rights were violated. 64
Before the Supreme Court, the shopping mall owner argued
that Lloyd should control. However, the Court disagreed, concluding
that the "reasoning in Lloyd. . . does not ... limit the authority of the
State to exercise its police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its
own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those con-
ferred by the Federal Constitution.,,65 The Court further held that the
mall owner's constitutional rights under the Fifth66 and Fourteenth
67
Amendments were not violated by judicial decision to allow the stu-
dents to enter upon the privately owned property and continue their
activities.68 The Court reasoned that prohibiting the mall from exer-
cising its right to exclude the students from the premises would not
"unreasonably impair the value or use of their property as a shopping
center., 69 As an alternative, the Court suggested that the mall prom-
ulgate regulations that protect its tenants from actions detrimental to
business operations.7 ° With respect to the mall owner's due process
argument, the Court held the mall owner failed to establish that its
64 Id. at 77-78.
65 PruneYard, 477 U.S. at 81 (citing Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967)).
66 U.S. CONST. amend. V states, in pertinent part: "No person shall.., be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation."
67 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I states, in pertinent part: 'No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...
68 PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 84. The Court noted "it is well established that 'not every de-
struction or injury to property by governmental action has been held to be a 'taking' in the
constitutional sense.' " Id. at 82 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960)).
69 PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 83.
70 Id. ("PruneYard may restrict expressive activity by adopting time, place, and manner
regulations that will minimize any interference with its commercial functions.").
256 [Vol. 24
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private property rights outweighed the state's interest in expanding
the right of freedom of speech.7 Accordingly, the Court held that a
mall owner's refusal to allow individuals to enter upon its privately-
owned property, which is open to the public, for the purpose of en-
gaging in peaceful solicitation and petitioning constituted a violation
of the state constitution's freedom of speech provision.72
New York State does not follow the same approach, as indi-
cated by the appellate division in Wenk. The Wenk court was guided
by the New York Court of Appeals' decision in SHAD Alliance v.
Smith Haven Mall.73 The Court of Appeals determined that New
York adheres to the rule that the "State ... constitutional guarantees
of freedom of speech protect the individual against action by go-
vernmental authorities, not by private persons. 7 4
In SHAD, a group of individuals from the SHAD and Pauma-
nok organizations entered the privately-owned Smith Haven Mall in
Suffolk County without the mall owner's authority and began distri-
buting opinionated information concerning the under-construction
Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant.75 Historically, the mall observed a
policy prohibiting protests or distribution of political materials on
mall premises to promote a business-oriented environment fueled by
consistent patronage and goodwill. 76 Mall security advised the solici-
71 Id. at 85.
72 Id. at 88.
7' 488 N.E.2d 1211 (N.Y. 1985).
74 SHAD, 488 N.E.2d at 1215.
71 Id. at 1213.
76 Id. at 1212 ("The Mall has consistently and nondiscriminatorily prohibited all leaflet-
ting, and... political activities .... ").
20081 257
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tors of the existing policy and ordered they refrain from continuing.77
Subsequently, the individuals filed a claim citing a free speech viola-
tion under the New York State Constitution, and moved for an in-
junction obliging mall ownership to allow the distribution of leaflets
within the mall.78
The trial court determined that the mall's policy prohibiting
the distribution of leaflets violated the free speech provision of the
New York Constitution. The appellate division affirmed, granting
the organizations the right to leaflet within the mall property. 79 The
New York Court of Appeals did not interpret the free speech provi-
sion as broadly as the lower courts.80 Instead, the court found the
"drafters of the ... free speech clause ... intended the State Constitu-
tion to govern the rights of citizens with respect to their government
and not the rights of private individuals against private individuals." 81
For a private individual to successfully assert a free speech claim un-
der the New York State Constitution there must be evidence of some
form of state action.82
In Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., the New York Court
of Appeals defined state action as83
Purely private conduct, however egregious or
unreasonable, does not rise to the level of constitu-
tional significance absent a significant nexus between
the State and the actors or the conduct. This nexus has
7 Id. at 1213.
78 Id.
71 SHAD, 488 N.E.2d at 1213.
80 id.
81 Id. at 1215.
82 Id. at 1217.
83 379 N.E.2d 1169 (N.Y. 1978).
[Vol. 24
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been denominated "State action" and is an essential
requisite to any action grounded on violation of equal
protection of the laws or a deprivation of due process
of law.84
Moreover, the state must be "significantly" involved with the
conduct of the private party in order for a constitutional claim to
arise. 85 To make this determination, the court listed a number of re-
levant factors, such as "whether the State is so entwined with the reg-
ulation of the private conduct as to constitute State activity [and]
whether there is meaningful State participation in the activity." 86
The New York Court of Appeals in SHAD applied the Shar-
rock reasoning to analyze whether the state was significantly in-
volved with the mall's conduct. 87 The organizations argued that the
mall conducted activities that characterize its operations as that of a
"public forum"; however, the court reasoned that such an argument is
irrelevant and does not offer proof of state action.88 Further, the court
found no similarities between the mall and the government, especial-
ly in terms of their respective conduct. 89 It followed that the plaintiff
failed to prove any significant involvement on the part of the state
government to suggest its conduct was "so entwined" with the mall's
prohibition on the distribution of pamphlets and leaflets within the
84 SHAD, 488 N.E.2d at 1172 (citation omitted).
85 Id.
86 id.
81 Id. at 1217.
88 "On some occasions the Mall has permitted local officials to park mobile vans in its
parking lot to offer public services such as advice to senior citizens and veterans and blood
and glaucoma tests." Id. at 1212.
89 SHAD, 488 N.E.2d at 1217.
2008] 259
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mall. 90 Accordingly, the New York Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the lower court, finding no state action and thus no state
constitutional issue. 91
In contrast, as set forth in the Supreme Court of New Jersey's
decision in New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v.
J.MB. Realty Corp.,92 New Jersey's own constitution protects free-
dom of speech "not only from abridgement by government, but also
from unreasonably restrictive and oppressive conduct by private enti-
ties. 93 In J.M.B. Realty, a coalition of different groups against U.S.
intervention in the Middle East, specifically in regards to the conflict
between Iraq and Kuwait, joined forces to initiate a leafleting cam-
paign to convince members of the public to protest the impending
vote on military intervention.94 The staging points for their campaign
were shopping malls, and after requesting and ultimately receiving
permission to assemble at a few mall locations, the coalition sought
an injunction to prevent the owners from denying them access to the
malls to carry on their campaign in accordance with their right to
freedom of speech.95 Some of the malls that agreed to allow the coa-
lition to enter its premises for its desired purpose imposed some re-
strictions on the coalition's freedom of speech rights such as prohibi-
tions on offensive speech, on approaching mall visitors, and on full
90 Id. at 1218.
91 Id.
92 650 A.2d 757 (N.J. 1994).
" J.M.B. Realty, 650 A.2d at 771. See N.J. CONST. art. I, § 6, which states, in pertinent
part: "Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the li-
berty of speech or of the press."
94 Id. at 762.
9' Id. at 766.
260 [Vol. 24
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access to the mall's premises.96 The trial court entered judgment in
favor of the mall owners, and that order was affirmed by New Jer-
sey's Appellate Division.97 However, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey reversed.9
The Supreme Court of New Jersey determined the freedom of
speech provisions afforded under the New Jersey State Constitution
were not limited to protections against governmental actions. 99 The
court identified three elements to consider in determining whether to
allow the protestors to conduct their activities on the privately-owned
mall property. 100 The court found the purpose of the mall seems to be
expanding with a variety of activities offered to the general public,
including commercial shopping, walkways for exercise, and commu-
nity and political information booths. 1 In addition, the court stated
that leafleting, in relation to the public and private uses of the mall,
would not interfere with the business aspect of the mall, and as a sa-
feguard, restrictions on the time, place, and manner of leafleting
would further secure the property. 0 2 Accordingly, the court held that
leafleting, as limited by the restrictions set forth by the mall, "will
perform the intended role of assuring that the free speech of New Jer-
sey's citizens can be heard, can be effective, and can reach at least as
96 Id.
97 Id.
9' J.M.B. Realty, 650 A.2d at 784.
" Id. at 771.
'oo Id. ("(1) the nature, purposes, and primary use of such private property ... (2) the ex-
tent and nature of the public's invitation to use that property, and (3) the purpose of the ex-
pressional activity undertaken upon such property in relation to both the private and public
use of the property.").
101 Id. at 772-75.
102 J.M.B. Realty, 650 A.2d at 775.
2008]
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many people as it used to before the downtown business districts
were transported to the malls."'' 0 3 In effect, New Jersey expanded its
free speech protections to cover violations committed by owners of
private property open to the public.
The underlying issue in the "shopping mall" cases concerns
the debate between private property "owners [who] seek to defend
their private property rights [and] [s]peech activists [who] seek to ex-
pand the areas where expressive activities are protected to include
shopping centers." 10 4  The federal courts appear to protect private
property owners by providing that those who prevent or prohibit
members of the public from entering upon their premises for protest-
ing purposes do not violate the free speech protections afforded under
the United States Constitution. 10 5 Individual state protection may be
broader. The right of free speech may protect protestors partaking in
political activities on private property. Thus, states may vary on
whether to afford more protection to private property rights or to
speech activists via expansion of free speech rights. 0 6
According to some scholars, the states that prefer to protect
the rights of free speech on private property, such as New Jersey and
California, are protecting the fundamental importance of the First
103 Id. at 783.
104 Frederick W. Schoepflin, Comment, Speech Activists in Shopping Centers: Must Prop-
erty Rights Give Way to Free Expression?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 133 (1989).
105 An exception rests in "company towns" where a "company assumes ownership of a
town, [and] it puts all areas traditionally open for expressive activities under private control.
.. See id. at 151 (citing Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)).
106 See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 81 ("[A] State in the exercise of its police power may
adopt reasonable restrictions on private property so long as the restrictions do not amount to
a taking without just compensation or contravene any other federal constitutional provi-
sion.").
262 [Vol. 24
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Amendment and are moving in the direction of the twenty-first cen-
tury, an age in which the "shopping mall is a central institution in
modem American society."'0 7 Other states, such as New York, rea-
son that there is no doubt that a privately-owned mall's prohibition of
protests "do[es] not constitute the state action necessary to implicate
federal constitutional protections."'' 0 8 Depending on the state, private
property owners may in fact infringe upon state constitutional rights
when they prohibit a party from expressing their right to freedom of
speech. For instance, assuming the facts to be those presented in
Wenk, New York would rule that the private mall owner did not vi-
olate the rights of the prohibited party under the New York Constitu-
tion, while California would determine, under those same facts, that
the mall owner did violate the party's free speech rights under the
California Constitution.10 9
New York seems to take more of a "traditional" approach to
its free speech analysis, relying on the historical nature of the subject
matter.110 In that respect, New York courts do a sufficient job in con-
serving the importance of "private autonomy and separation of pow-
ers" by mandating that there be state action as an element of the anal-
ysis. " ' Otherwise, there would be few or no limits on private
property as to the right of freedom of speech and surely that would
become burdensome on shopping mall owners and those who fre-
107 Mark C. Alexander, Attention, Shoppers: The First Amendment in the Modern Shop-
ping Mall, 41 ARiz. L. REv. 1, 38 (1999).
108 Id. at 315.
109 See SHAD, 488 N.E.2d at 1211. See also PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 74.
10 SHAD, 66 N.E.2d at 1213.
... Id. at 1216.
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quent their properties. Thus, according to some scholars, the issue is
"[w]hether to legitimate trespass by speech activists, not whether to
remedy wrongful acts by shopping center owners."' 12 Clearly, New
York chose to protect the private property rights to the extent they
prohibit expressive activities by nondiscriminatory means.
However, the ultimate decision rests in the hands of the vari-
ous state judiciaries, which may choose to interpret the inherent right
of freedom of speech in a broader fashion. The issue will continue to
present itself in the federal and state courts as the debate over how to
protect expressive activities without infringing upon private property
rights rages on.
Steven Fox
112 See Schoepflin, supra note 104, at 143.
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SEARCH & SEIZURE
United States Constitution Amendment IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
New York Constitution article I, section 12:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
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